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Stereotypes, role models played by teachers and social norms are known to push girls to 
choose humanities rather than science. Do professors directly contribute to this strong 
selection by discriminating more against girls in more scientific subjects? Using the entrance 
exam of a French higher education institution (the Ecole Normale Supérieure) as a natural 
experiment, we show the opposite: discrimination goes in favor of females in more male-
connoted subjects (e.g. math, philosophy) and in favor of males in more female-connoted 
subjects (e.g. literature, biology), inducing a rebalancing of sex ratios between science and 
humanities majors. We identify discrimination by systematic differences in students’ scores 
between oral tests (non-blind toward gender) and anonymous written tests (blind toward 
gender). By making comparisons of these oral/written scores differences between different 
subjects for a given student, we are able to control both for a student’s ability in each subject 
and for her overall ability at oral exams. The mechanisms likely to drive this positive 
discrimination toward the minority gender are also discussed. 
 
JEL codes: I23, J16 
Keywords: discrimination, gender stereotypes, natural experiment, sex and science  
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1. Introduction 
Why are there so few girls in science? Although gender differences have disappeared or 
evolved in favour of girls in many educational outcomes such as college enrolment, male and 
female students are still strongly segregated across majors. Females compose only 25% of the 
science, technology, engineering, and math workforce (National Science Foundation 2006) 
whereas for instance less than one third of new college students in humanities at Yale in 2006 
were males
4
. Understanding the origin of these discrepancies is important from an economic 
perspective: gender differences in entry into science careers accounts for a significant part of 
the gender pay differential among college graduates (Brown & Cororan 1997; Weinberger 
1999) and may also reduce aggregate productivity (Weinberger 1998).  
The reasons for the underrepresentation of women in science have been debated by several 
academic papers, government reports as well as pro-women lobbies. Some important 
contributions have been made in the literature. We first know that gender differences in math 
and science test scores are very small and have lowered during the past twenty years. 
Weinberger (2001) has shown that these small gender differences in abilities do not explain 
the gender gap in science careers: conditional on proxies for ability, women are still between 
50% and 70% less likely than men to complete a degree in science, technology, engineering, 
or math (Weinberger 2001). Many studies have also established that professors may serve as 
role models in higher education and that professors’ gender strongly affect female college 
students’ attainment and their likelihood to major in science (Canes & Rosen 1995; Rothstein 
1999; Gardecki & Neumark 1998; Bettinger & Long 2005; Hoffman & Oreopoulos 2009; 
Carrell, Page & West 2010). Finally, the gender differences in preferences documented by the 
experimental literature, such as the gender differences in risk aversion, taste for competition 
or altruism, have also been put forward as candidate explanations for the gender gap in 
science majors’ enrolment.   
 
By looking at the determinants of students’ educational and career choice, the literature on 
gender gaps across college majors has mostly focused on the supply side. But the equilibrium 
share of female finally observed in science (and in each other major) is at the intersection 
between the supply and the demand for female in the field. However, only little is known on 
the exact role played by the demand side in shaping the observed gender gap in science 
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careers. Do science professors want girls in their course, and more broadly, in their field? If 
not, women may rationally shy away from science if they know that they are likely to be 
discriminated in science careers. Women may also be implicitly or explicitly (discrimination) 
driven away from science majors by professors.  
 
In this paper, we study the direct contribution of the demand side to gender segregation across 
majors in higher education. Using a unique dataset on the entrance exam of a French top 
higher education institution, the Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS), for years 2004 to 2009, we 
show that girls are favored by the exam’s jury in the more masculine areas (such as math) 
whereas boys are favored by the exam’s jury in the more feminine areas (such as biology or 
literature). Our results thus indicate that the demand for students in each major is biased in 
favor of the minority gender, which induces a reduction of gender segregation across majors. 
Although the magnitude of the bias is large in many subjects, its direction may be opposite for 
the same candidate with regard to the subject. As a consequence, the overall effect lowers 
only slightly the huge gender gaps by major already induced by the relative supply of males 
and females candidates in each major of the ENS entrance exam.  
 
Our paper relates to the literature on gender stereotypes. It has been known for long that 
gender stereotypes affect teachers’ perceptions (Dusek & Joseph 1983; Madon et al. 1998), 
which in turn affect the way they evaluate their pupils (Bernard 1979), and the way children 
perceive their own ability (Tiedemann 2000). A typical gender stereotype is that boys excel in 
math and science and girls excel in other subjects (Deaux & LaFrance 1998). On the basis of 
such a stereotype, girls may be encouraged to pursue traditional female studies instead of 
math or science. Such a behavior has been documented by indirect evidence based on 
subjective questionnaires answered by parents of first grade students (Carr, Jessup & Fuller 
1999) or by PhD holding students (Rowsey 1997), as well as by psychological tests of 
perception (Glick, Wilk & Perreault 1995). From these studies and the literature on gender 
stereotypes, we might certainly have expected a stronger discrimination against females in 
more male-connoted subject areas. By showing the opposite, our results indicate that 
professors’ evaluations are not directly driven by simplistic stereotypes such as “girls are not 
good in science”. This discrepancy between what we find and what was suggested by earlier 
work may be explained by differences in methodology. Previous literature linking gender 
stereotypes to gender segregation across subjects was largely based on declared perceptions. 
However, our paper is (to our knowledge) the first to use a natural experiment to explicitly 
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study the effect of gender discrimination on gender segregation. Interestingly, a similar 
discrepancy can be found in a slightly different context: using a natural experiment similar to 
ours, Lavy (2008) shows that high school teachers in Israel systematically discriminate in 
favor of girls. His results also go against the general view according to which gender 
stereotypes should harm girls at school. In this paper, we push Lavy’s work one step further 
by explicitly identifying stereotypes (e.g. “girls are not good in science”, “girls are good in 
humanities”) and by showing that discrimination actually goes against these precise 
stereotypes. 
 
To identify the existence of gender discrimination, we use a natural experiment based on the 
design of the ENS entrance exam. The ENS candidates have to take both a blind written test 
(their gender is not known by the professor who grades the test) and a non-blind oral test in 
several subjects. As long as the scores obtained by the candidates at written and oral tests are 
comparable, i.e., as long as they measure the same skills and cognitive abilities, the blind 
written score can be used as the counterfactual measure to the non-blind oral score, which 
may be affected (“treated”) by discrimination. This identification framework is similar to that 
used by Lavy (2008) in a context that relates closely to ours, by Goldin and Rouse (2000) and 
by Blank (1991). We use the difference between the males' and females' gaps between the 
blind and the non-blind test scores as a measure of a potential gender bias in a given subject. 
We control for various observable characteristics of the ENS candidates, for reversion to the 
mean and for the initial ability of the candidates. In particular, we show that the distributions 
of the scores of male and female candidates are remarkably similar at written tests in all 
subjects, whereas sizeable differences appear at oral tests. 
 
In the context of this study, our proposed identification strategy has two potential 
shortcomings. The first one is that female handwriting may differ from male handwriting. 
Females can thus be detected at written tests. As a consequence, written tests may not be 
completely blind. We argue that this problem is not likely to be important. Discussions with 
several professors or teachers that have already graded written tests suggest that a candidate’s 
gender is not so easy to detect with certainty at written tests. Grading a supposedly female-
handwritten test is also very different from facing the physical presence of a female or male 
candidate at an oral exam. More importantly, the fact that written tests are not perfectly blind 
with respect to gender can only lead us to underestimate gender discrimination: in the extreme 
case where gender is perfectly detectable at written tests and affect the jury similarly in both 
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written and oral tests, we should not find any difference between males’ and females’ gaps 
between the oral and written tests.  
  
The second shortcoming is that written and oral tests do not measure exactly the same skills. 
Characteristics such as oral expression, appearance, self-confidence or shyness are likely to 
affect the candidates’ scores at oral tests a lot more than their scores at written tests. If there 
are systematic differences between males and females regarding these characteristics, the 
double differences estimates cannot be interpreted as discrimination. However, the nature of 
this study allows us to overcome this problem to a large extent. Indeed, the design of the 
natural experiment we use gives the opportunity to implement two distinct strategies, both 
relying on “triple-differences”.  
First, we compare males and females not only between oral and written tests, but also between 
majors. The dataset includes results of students coming from 5 different majors (or tracks) 
with very different share of female candidates: Math-Physics, Physics-Chemistry, Biology-
Geology, Social sciences and Humanities. For example, females have represented 11.6% of 
the 250 students admitted from the Math-Physics track and 58.5% of the 453 students 
admitted from the Humanities track over the period 2004-2009. An important feature of this 
study is to document a premium for female candidates between the oral and written tests that 
varies positively with the “degree of masculinity” of the candidates’ major. In the same way, 
we show that if the admission had been decided only on the basis of the written tests (i.e. 
ignoring the oral tests), there would have been 4.1 percentage points less girls in the Math-
Physics track and 2.6 percentage points more girls in the Humanities track. For these results to 
be explained by gender differences in oral tests skills, one has to argue that girls’ oral abilities 
are higher than boys’ in the Math-Physics track whereas they are lower in the Humanities 
track. These kinds of hypothesis that may bias our results are already quite complex and 
probably less likely to be true. As illustrated by this example, our goal is not to identify the 
absolute value of the discrimination that affects the candidates’ scores at oral tests. It is rather 
to study how such discrimination varies depending on the candidates’ major. Adding this third 
dimension – the degree of feminization of a given major –improves our identification because 
it allows us to get rid of all the difference in abilities that are uniform across majors.  
However, there is already a lot of gender segregation across majors among the ENS 
candidates. This is likely to reflect a strong selection process of the candidates.  We may not 
expect that the roughly 10% of females in the Math-Physics track are identical to the roughly 
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60% of females in the Humanities track in terms of their oral abilities. The few women that 
have decided to major in Math-Physics despite strong social norms against such a choice may 
have particular preferences and unobserved characteristics (to the econometrician). They may 
be for example especially self-confident, which in turn may affect their performance at oral 
tests. Comparing the oral premium for girls in the different majors does not tackle this issue. 
We thus also carry out within-candidate between-subjects comparisons. A nice feature of our 
data is indeed that each candidate in a given track is observed both at written and oral tests in 
several subjects (5 in average). It is thus possible to investigate how the oral/written test gap 
evolves across subjects for a same candidate. By differentiating the oral/written test gap 
between subjects, we control for the general ability of the candidates at oral tests. This 
individual fixed effects strategy strengthens our previous results: the oral premium for a given 
girl in a given track is higher on average in the most masculine subjects (computer sciences, 
mathematics, physics) as compared to the most feminine ones (foreign languages, literature, 
biology), and the opposite is true for boys.   
 
Finally, we discuss the different mechanisms that are likely to drive our results. First, the ENS 
and its jury members may implement a conscious affirmative action towards the minority 
gender in each major. The fact that we find strong differences across subjects within a given 
track suggests that this is not a good explanation. We also test for the presence of a 
discontinuity in the distribution of average scores at the admission threshold using the 
technique developed by McCrary (2007). Indeed, if our results reflect a kind of quota policy 
implemented (non-officially) by the ENS, we may expect that some females are pushed up ex 
post above the admission threshold, inducing a detectable discontinuity in the average scores’ 
distribution. We do not find evidence of such a discontinuity.  
However, three other mechanisms may explain our results. The first is that the professors that 
grade the candidates have an unconscious taste for the gender in minority and practice a pure 
preference-based discrimination: math professors are just happier when they have the unusual 
occasion to interview a female candidate whereas the same is true for literature professors 
with respect to male candidates. The oral premium towards the minority gender would in that 
case reflect a kind of taste for diversity.  
In contrast, the second plausible mechanism is directly linked to students’ abilities. 
Paradoxically, professors may rationally favor girls in science even if they have negative 
stereotypes against their abilities. This may happen if they value not only the actual 
performance but also other qualities such as self-investment and perseverance: if girls are in 
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average less able than boys in science, they probably had to exhibit more efforts and 
motivation to reach the same performance level. As the ability to provide lots of efforts and 
self-investment may be important for their long-term achievements (ENS students are meant 
to pursue research careers), professors may want to value these attributes.  
The last plausible mechanism is information-based and is concerned with statistical 
discrimination. If the professors grading the oral tests do not perfectly observe the candidates’ 
abilities and believe that the few girls’ candidates in the Math-Physics track are positively 
selected, they may use such a prior when grading the oral tests and consequently favor these 
girls. Having a positive a priori towards the gender in minority might be rational for the jury: 
when a female (resp. male) has chosen a major that is socially strongly connoted for males 
(resp. females), she/he is probably highly motivated and feels good enough to manage in an 
environment that may be adverse (see Fryer, 2007, for a formal presentation of this “belief 
flipping” mechanism). After having presented our main results, we discuss how these three 
mechanisms are likely to drive them.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data. Section 3 
presents our empirical specifications. Our main results come in section 4. Section 5 discusses 
three potential underlying mechanisms that are likely to drive our results. 
 
2. Data 
As our empirical specifications strongly depend on the design of our natural experiment, we 
start by describing our data and the functioning of the ENS entrance exams. 
Ecole Normale Supérieure of Paris entrance exams 
The French higher education system is said to be particularly selective: after high school, the 
best students can enter into a very difficult 2 years preparatory school that prepares them for 
the entrance exams of selective universities called Grandes Ecoles. About 10% of high school 
graduates choose this way and are selected into a specific major: the main historic ones are 
Mathematics-Physics, Physics-Chemistry, Biology-Geology, Humanities, Social Sciences. 
The major in which a student is involved in the preparatory school determines the set of 
Grandes Ecoles in which she may candidate, as well as the set of subjects on which she will 
be tested. These Grandes Ecoles are divided into 4 groups: 215 Ecoles d’Ingénieur for 
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scientific and technical studies (the most famous is called Ecole Polytechnique), a few 
hundred Ecoles de Commerce for management and business studies, a few hundred Schools 
for studies in biology, agronomy or veterinary, and three Ecole Normale Supérieure (ENS). 
The number of available places in each Grande Ecole is predefined and limited, implying that 
the Grandes Ecoles entrance exams are in fact contests.  
The three ENS are aimed to prepare students for high-level teaching and academic careers 
positions (about 80% of their students eventually do a PhD). The ENS of Paris on which this 
study focuses is the most prestigious of them and the yearly entrance exams are designed to 
select the best performing students through a set of very demanding tests. The ENS are also 
the only Grandes Ecoles to be generalist: they accept students from the five historical 
preparatory schools’ majors. As a consequence, the entrance exams for the ENS of Paris are 
divided into 5 groups that we call “tracks”. Candidates from a given major in preparatory 
schools apply in the track that corresponds to this major and they compete only with other 
students from the same major. They are tested in a set of subjects that is specific to their track 
(see Appendix tables A1 and A2). However, a nice feature of the ENS entrance exams is that 
many subjects are common across tracks, although the tests’ precise content remains track-
specific
5
. Importantly, both the difficulty of the tests and the jury of the ENS entrance exams 
remain track and subject specific. This means for example the math test in the Math-Physics 
track is more difficult and graded by a different jury than the math test in the Social-Sciences 
track.  
The overall structure of the exam is the same in all tracks. Students take a first “eligibility” 
step of written tests (about 3500 candidates from all majors every year) and all candidates 
from a given major are then ranked according to a weighted average of all written test scores. 
The best-ranked students are declared eligible for the second step (the threshold is major-
specific with a total of about 500 eligible students). This second “admission” step consists in 
oral
6
 tests on the same subjects
7
. Finally, eligible candidates of each major are ranked 
according to a weighted average of all written and oral test scores and the best ones are 
admitted in the ENS. The admission threshold is again major-specific and defined by law (see 
Table 1 for the yearly average number of eligible and admitted candidates from each major). 
                                                          
5
 As will appear later on, our empirical strategy relies extensively on the fact that the ENS accepts students from 
different majors and that some subjects are common across majors. 
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7
 Teachers never know the grades obtained by the student at the written tests. 
 9 
We only focus on the roughly 500 students that are eligible for the oral exams each year. We 
have data for years 2004 to 2009, giving us the universe of the 3068 eligible candidates that 
took both the written and oral steps in one of the five main tracks of the ENS entrance exam 
(table 1). 36% of these eligible candidates were finally accepted in the ENS
8
. 40% of both the 
eligible and finally admitted candidates are girls. However, the proportion of female 
candidates varies dramatically across majors (see table 1). For example, girls only account for 
9% of the candidates in the Math-Physics track whereas they account for 64% of the 
candidates in Humanities. Interestingly, the proportion of girls among admitted candidates is 
higher than their proportion among eligible candidates only in the most scientific tracks. Our 
data also include some individual characteristics for candidates of years 2006-2009 only. We 
know their social background, the preparatory school they come from, if they got their 
Baccalaureat (the national exam at the end of high-school) with honors and if they were a 
repeater in their preparatory school
9
. There are some significant gender differences 
concerning these variables: females are more likely to have obtained their Baccalaureat with 
high honors in most tracks and they are more likely to come from a high social background in 
the Humanities track (see Appendix table A3). To control for the potential biases that these 
discrepancies could induce, we include these variables in some of our empirical 
specifications.  
In each track, eligible candidates take a given set of written and oral exams in various subjects 
(see table 2). Unfortunately, there are not systematically a written blind test and an oral non-
blind test for all subjects.  In each track, we only consider the subjects for which there is both 
a compulsory written test and a compulsory oral test for all students
10
. This leaves us with a 
calibrated sample of 25,644 test scores (half written, half oral). Depending on the track, there 
are between three and six subjects for which all students have scores both at written and oral 
tests (see table 2). Note that some tests may be chosen as an option by students (see appendix 
tables A1 and A2). As a consequence, we cannot observe all the students in these tests. We 
have chosen to exclude these optional tests in our empirical analysis because, as these tests 
reveal students preferences, they may induce a strong selection of students who take them as 
well as particular grading practices by evaluators. Our results are nonetheless robust to 
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including these optional tests. The number of candidates that have taken both a non-optional 
written test and a non-optional oral test in each subject in each track is given in table 2. This 
number may vary slightly from a subject to another (within a track) because a few students 
did not present themselves to all tests (e.g. because of illness). Besides, the number of 
candidates is lower for tests on Latin/Ancient Greek and Foreign languages because we only 
kept data for students who chose the same language at both written and oral tests, so that both 
call for the same abilities
11
. 
Finally, scores at each written or oral tests in a given subject have been standardized to a 
distribution with zero mean and a unit standard deviation.  
Indexes for subjects and tracks degree of feminization  
We build an index    in order to characterize how “feminine” or “masculine” a given subject 
is. To keep the index simple, we consider the proportion of women among professors 
(Professeurs des universités) and assistant professors (Maîtres de Conférences) working in the 
corresponding field in French universities
12
. This choice is particularly relevant in our context 
because most of the students recruited by the ENS are going to become researchers. The value 
that takes our index for each subject is given in parenthesis in table 2, whose columns have 
been ordered according to this index
13
.  
We then build an index    that characterizes how “feminine” or “masculine” is a given track. 
To do so, we simply take a weighted average of our first subject-level index over all the 
subjects present in a given track, the weights being the actual coefficients that are applied to 
subjects when computing the student final averaged score and rank in the track. The value of 
this second index for each track is given in parenthesis in table 2, whose rows have been 
ordered according to this index. Here again, alternative indexes could be constructed, such as 
one corresponding to the share of female eligible candidates in each track. Taking this latter 
index rather than the former does not affect our results.  
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We finally build a third index     giving the relative degree of feminization of a given subject 
in a given track by subtracting to the subject index the value the corresponding track index: 
         . The goal of this index is to capture the fact that for example chemistry is 
relatively feminine subject in the Physics-Chemistry track whereas it is a relatively masculine 
subject in the Biology track.  
 
3. Empirical specifications 
As candidates may share unobservable characteristics that are correlated to their gender and 
may affect their score, the gap between girls’ and boys’ average scores at oral examinations 
cannot be directly interpreted as a result of teachers’ discrimination. In order to identify the 
role of teachers in students’ grades, researchers usually implement difference-in-differences 
strategies. They compare for instance the score gap of the same candidates between two 
different subjects with different teachers (Dee 2007), or at the same subject between two 
different tests that are respectively blind and non-blind toward gender (Lindahl 2007; Lavy 
2008). Implicitly, they assume students’ individual effects to be fixed between both test’s 
score so that their difference correctly identifies teachers’ effects. Thus, the difference 
between boys’ and girls’ score gaps should give an unbiased estimate of teachers’ gender 
discrimination.  
Basic regressions (gender differences in oral-written score gap) 
Similarly, we use the fact that our data on the ENS entrance exams contain both written 
anonymous tests and oral tests for a given eligible candidate in a given subject. The structure 
of the data with systematically one written and one oral test for each candidate in each subject 
makes it possible to use a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, similarly to Lavy 
(2008). More specifically, the score of candidate i in subject j is a function of gender (F), the 
oral nature of the test (O) and their interaction. Assuming a linear model, we can write: 
                                                                                                          (1) 
where      is the score of candidate i at test of type o (written or oral) in subject j.    is an 
indicator equal to 1 for female candidates and      is an indicator equal to one for oral tests. 
    is an individual fixed effect by subject that will take as value the score of candidate i at 
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her written test in subject j.    measures the difference between average scores at oral and 
written tests in subject j for men.    is finally our parameter of interest: it measures the 
difference between oral and written tests in subject j for women, on top of the respective 
difference for men. As long as individual effects are assumed constant between written and 
oral tests,    may be interpreted as the effect of the jury’s bias toward girls in subject j (see 
Lavy, 2008, p. 2088 for details). This assumption does not hold for instance if girls are less 
competent than boys at oral exams (discussed later).  
To simplify our empirical analysis and future exposition, we consider an equivalent of 
equation (1) in first differences. Noting                        , we thus start by estimating: 
                                                                                                                          (2) 
Since our data consists in a sample of 6 years pooled together, we have allowed    to vary by 
year. However, since our goal is not to study across-time evolutions, we suppose that    is 
constant over the period of observation (in order to maximize our statistical power). We can 
also add controls for individual characteristics that may be correlated to both gender and the 
first differences in scores (parents’ occupations, age, former results at the Baccalauréat exam 
and former preparatory school):  
                                                                                                                     (3) 
where Xi is a set of non-varying individual characteristics. Because these variables are only 
available since 2006, equation (2) may only be estimated on the 2006-2009 sub-sample. 
The differences-in-differences nature of equation (2) means that account is taken of any 
ability measure that has a similar effect on the written and oral scores. However, if ability 
affects each of the scores differently, the difference of the two scores will depend on ability as 
well. We then get the following a model: 
                                                                                                                   (4) 
where     is the unobserved ability of candidate i in subject j. The fact that ability may be 
loaded differently in the written and oral test scores’ equations will bias our results if the 
distribution of abilities is different for male and female candidates. However, we will provide 
some evidence showing that the distributions of scores at written tests are quite similar for 
male and female candidates. We will also try to control directly for ability in our empirical 
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analysis by estimating equation (4) using as a proxy for     the quartile of candidate i ’s score 
in the score distribution of the written test in subject j.
14
 
Within-candidate between-subjects differences 
There may finally be an unobserved ability component    
   that is specific to oral tests and 
that does not intervene in written tests. In that case, equation (2) would write: 
                 
                                                                                                     (5) 
We use the most interesting feature of our dataset – the fact that each candidate takes both a 
written and an oral test in several different subjects – to deal, at least partly, with this issue. 
To do this, we need to suppose that the oral ability component    
  is common across subjects 
and can be written   
 . In that case, we can directly control for it by estimating a version of 
the first difference equation (2) with individual fixed effects: 
                                                                                                                    (6) 
where    capture the general ability of candidate i at oral tests. Identification now relies on 
variations of the oral/written score differences across subjects for female and male candidates. 
Due to this, equation (6) can only identify in each track the differential in scores between 
female and male candidates in all subjects but one taken as reference, and for which we 
impose the difference to be zero (see for example Dee, 2005 for a similar normalization). We 
finally estimate versions of equation (6) that include our controls for the general ability of the 
candidates (their quartile in the written test score distribution in each subject).  
Our final exercise consists in nesting together all our estimates by track and subject using our 
two indexes for the feminine character of subjects and tracks. To do so, we estimate equations 
such as: 
                                                                                                               (7) 
where    is the index for the degree of feminization of subject j. In our empirical analysis, 
equivalents of equation (7) will also be estimated without controlling for students’ general 
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 We try to avoid to control directly by the candidates’ score at written tests on the left hand side because the 
variable would then appear on both side of the equation, rending our fixed-effect setting ineffective.  
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oral abilities   , as well as using our indexes for the degree of feminizations of tracks (  ) and 
for the relative degree of feminization of a subject within a track (   ). 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Gender differences between oral and written test scores by tracks 
We start by applying our difference-in-differences estimation strategy (equation 2) at the track 
level. To do so, we simply average, in each track, the oral premium for girls in all subjects in 
which oral and written tests are both non optional (see table 2)
15
. We also estimate the oral 
premium for females at the level of the whole ENS entrance exam by pooling all tracks 
together. Our results show that the average difference between oral and written test scores at 
the ENS entrance exam for years 2004 to 2009 is significantly lower for girls (by about 5% of 
a standard deviation (s.d.) – see table 3, panel A, column 1). However, this differential varies 
strongly across tracks. Positive in the Math-Physics track (by about 10% of a s.d. – see 
column 2), the difference becomes negative in the Humanities track (by about 10% of a s.d. – 
see column 6). According to our index, the Math-Physics and Humanities track are 
respectively the most male-connoted and the most female-connoted tracks of the ENS 
entrance exam. It thus appears that discrimination, if any, goes in favor of girls in the most 
male-connoted tracks and in favor of boys in the most female-connoted tracks. Consistent 
with this theory, we do not find significant differences between female and male candidates 
oral premiums in the Physics-Chemistry, Biology-Geology and Social-Sciences tracks. These 
tracks indeed stand between Math-Physics and Humanities in terms of their degree of 
feminization.  
The lower panel of table 4 gives the proportion of girls finally admitted in the ENS in each 
track during years 2004 to 2009, as well as the number of girls that would have been accepted 
if the exam had only consisted in the written exams. These statistics have been computed 
from candidates’ rank at the exam, as well as from their rank at the eligibility step (i.e. after 
the written tests only). They allow us to confirm our regression results on the full sample of 
tests and to present quantified estimates of what might have been the consequences of 
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 All the following results are not only robust but strengthened by the inclusion of optional subjects such as 
Computer sciences in the Math-Physics track, or Geography in the Social Sciences and Humanities tracks. 
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discriminatory behaviors from the jury members on the final sex ratios in each track
16
. If the 
exam had stopped after the eligibility step, the proportion and number of girls among the 
admitted candidates would have been 4% higher (in relative terms) than the actual proportion 
and number of girls among the accepted candidates (panel B, column 1). However, this 
statistics varies again dramatically across tracks. In the Math-Physics track, the number of 
admitted girls is as high as 55% higher than what it would have been if the exam had stopped 
after the written tests.  This number is still positive in the Physics-Chemistry track and gets 
negative in other tracks. Overall, results in panel B are consistent with our regression 
estimates presented in panel A.  
One might worry that the distribution of abilities between girls and boys in the different tracks 
are so different that our gender comparisons are not relevant. Girls might for example be in 
the lower part of the ability distribution in the Math-Physics track whereas they are in the 
upper part of the ability distribution in the Humanities track. In that case, our results could 
simply reflect composition effects in the ability distribution combined with reversion to the 
mean or a variable return to ability along the ability distribution. Figure 1 gives the 
distribution of test scores for both males and females eligible candidates at written and oral 
tests in each track. When all tracks are considered together, the distributions of scores at 
written tests are remarkably similar for girls and boys
17
 (see the first two graphs in figure 1). 
It is only at oral tests that the distribution of girls’ test scores appears to be shifted leftward 
relative to the distribution of boys’ test scores. The test scores distributions at written tests for 
males and females candidates are still very similar when we consider tracks separately. They 
are perfectly matched in the Physics-Chemistry and Humanities tracks whereas minor 
differences appear in other tracks. Finally, comparisons of the scores’ distributions for boys 
and girls at oral and written tests confirm the pattern that emerged in table 3: in the Math-
Physics track, the girls’ distribution is shifted to the right at oral tests relative to that of boys 
whereas the opposite occurs in the Humanities track. 
4.2 Gender differences between oral and written test scores by subject (and track) 
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 These ranks are computed by the exam board as a weighted average of all test scores in the exam, including 
optional tests and tests in subjects for which there is only a written or an oral test. Conversely, results presented 
on Table 3 panel A are estimated from non-weighted regression, giving an equal weight to each subject. 
However, weighting our regressions only strengthen our results since discrimination behaviors appear to be 
usually stronger in the most important subjects in each track (see table 4).   
17
 The scores' distributions at written tests could also be computed on a larger sample that also includes 
candidates that were not eligible for oral tests. When doing so, we find that females are dominated by males in 
all tracks at written tests. 
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Girls seem to be favored in the most male-connoted tracks and boys in the most female-
connoted tracks. We now investigate the existence of a similar pattern between the different 
subjects of a given track. Are girls favored in the most masculine subjects of a given track 
exam and boys in the most feminine subjects?  
Our goal is twofold: comforting our results by track and solving some important identification 
issues that affect our results by track. Indeed, even if male and female candidates selected for 
the oral tests appear to have very similar abilities at written tests in all tracks (figure 1), they 
may be selected with respect to their oral abilities. The few women that have decided to major 
in Math-Physics despite strong social norms against such a choice may be for example 
especially self-confident or motivated, which in turn may affect their performance at oral tests 
more strongly than their performance at written tests. To tackle this problem, we now make 
comparisons within tracks, between the different subjects for which we have both non-
optional written and oral test scores. Our estimates of the oral/written premium for girls 
relative to boys in the different subjects of a given track (see table 2) are obtained on the same 
sample of candidates. As a consequence, between subjects differences in the oral premium for 
girls in a given track cannot be attributed to unobservable gender differences in our sample of 
candidates.  
Table 4, panel A, presents estimates obtained by regressing, in each track and subject, 
differences between oral and written test scores on an indicator equal to one for female 
candidates. For the sake of clarity, we have pooled together observations for all subjects in a 
given track and we have saturated the corresponding estimated equation with dummies for 
each subject in each year and dummies for each subject interacted with gender
18
. Both tracks 
and subjects are sorted according to their degree of feminization (according to our indexes). 
To give a better idea of the sense of our estimates, we have plotted them on a 3-d graph in 
figure 2.  
Evidence globally supports the idea that within each track, girls are more favored in more 
male-connoted subjects. Perhaps not surprisingly, the premium for girls at oral tests in the 
Math-Physics track is almost entirely due to the Math subject in which females get an oral 
versus written test premium relative to males which is as high as 40% of a s.d. over the period 
2004-2009. The oral versus written test premium is also positive, although non-significant, in 
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 We checked that our results are identical to what would be obtained by estimating one equation for each 
subject in each track.  
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the physics subject. Finally, this premium turns negative (although non-significant) in Foreign 
Languages which is, according to our index, almost the most feminine subject. If we move to 
other track, a similar pattern is observed. However, in more feminine tracks, estimates for all 
subjects are uniformly shifted downward and girls get discriminated. For example, the 
premium in the math subject does not appear in the Physics-Chemistry track and in the Social-
Sciences track. In the Physics-Chemistry track, girls get a negative premium in chemistry 
which is the most feminine of the scientific subjects present in the track. A same pattern is 
observable in the Biology-Geology track where girls get a strong penalty (40% of a s.d.) in 
biology which is the most feminine scientific subject present in the track.  In the Social-
Sciences track, females seem to get a premium at oral tests relative to males in philosophy, 
which is the most masculine non-scientific subject of this (non-scientific) track. On the other 
hand, they are penalized in literature, which is conversely the most feminine subject in the 
track, even though the estimate remains non-significant. Female candidates experience a 
penalty in the oral foreign languages test relative to the written one in almost all tracks, and 
this penalty is particularly high in the Humanities track. In this track, girls are almost 
penalized everywhere and especially in the most feminine subjects.  
It seems that a general pattern emerges from table 4, panel A. The premium for female 
candidates at oral tests decreases both when one moves rightward in a given row and 
downward in a given column. Of course, there are some exceptions. We think that most of the 
exceptions observed are due to the fact that comparisons are more relevant within scientific 
subjects in scientific tracks, and within non-scientific subjects in non-scientific tracks. The 
remaining exceptions may be due to some context specific elements, to the weakness of our 
indexes of feminization or to the lack of precision of some of our estimates. A case by case 
study would be required to understand exactly what happens in each test, which is certainly 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
In order to directly control for candidates’ general ability at oral tests, we have also estimated 
the effect of being a girl on the difference between oral and written test scores in 
specifications that include individual fixed effects (equation 6 – see table 4, panel B). The 
inclusion of these fixed effects implies that we can now only identify variations across 
subjects of premium for girls at oral tests relative to written tests. As a consequence, one 
subject has been chosen as a reference in each track. We have taken foreign languages as 
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reference in all tracks
19
 but the Social-Sciences track in which literature is the reference 
subject. The general pattern observed in panel A is still observable in this “triple-differences” 
framework. In the Math-Physics track, female candidates get a significantly higher oral versus 
written premium in math than in foreign languages. In the Physics-Chemistry (resp. Biology-
Geology) track, there is still a penalty for female candidates in chemistry (resp. biology), 
which is the most female-connoted scientific subjects. Female candidates are favored in the 
most male-connoted non-scientific subject (philosophy) in the Social Sciences and 
Humanities tracks. Note that comparisons between tracks should not be made in table 4 panel 
B since the estimates only give within track variations between subjects.  
We made several robustness checks for our results. Specifications without individual fixed 
effects (Panel A) are reproduced with individual controls for years 2006-2009 in table A4-
Panel A and with controls for the candidates’ initial ability in each subject (taken as the 
quartile of the written test scores distribution they belong to) in table A4-Panel B
20
. 
Specifications with fixed effects (Panel B) are reproduced with controls for the candidates’ 
initial ability in each subject (taken as the quartile they belong to in the written test scores’ 
distribution) in table A4-Panel C. Results in the 3 panels of table A4 are globally similar to 
those presented in table 4, showing that our results are not driven by gender differences in 
candidates’ observable characteristics. 
4.3 Gender differences between oral and written test scores depending on the degree of 
feminization of tracks and subjects 
We finally nest together the disaggregated results presented in table 4, by estimating the effect 
of gender interacted linearly with our indexes of feminization (equation 7) on the full sample 
of ENS candidates. Consistent with our previous results, the oral premium for girls is 
significantly lower in the most feminine subjects (table 5, column 1 without fixed effects and 
column 6 with fixed effects). A 10 percentage points increase in the proportion of female 
scholars (both professors and assistant professors) in a field leads to a decrease of the oral 
                                                          
19
 We have done so to facilitate comparisons across tracks since foreign languages is the subject which appears 
in the largest number of tracks.  
20
 We controlled for initial ability to check if our results were not only driven by mean reversion. If girls were 
better than boys at written tests on feminine subjects, the written-oral differential may be higher for girls on 
masculine subjects without any discrimination. Although controls added on table A4 and panel B may be 
sufficient to solve this problem, we also performed other analyses. First, we estimated gender gaps in written 
scores by subject and track. The results showed that there were significant gender gaps in anonymous written 
tests, but the estimates were not systematically correlated with our results (for instance, girls had higher grades at 
the written mathematic test of the Math-Physics track). Moreover, results presented in table 4 are robust to the 
inclusion of girls’ average written test score in each subject as an additional control. Results available on request. 
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versus written premium for girls of about 7% of a s.d. in the corresponding subject. This is a 
strong effect: it means that the difference in oral premiums for girls between math, where 
15% of professors are female, and foreign languages, where 56% of professors are female, is 
above 25% of a s.d. The oral premium for girls is also significantly lower in the most 
feminine tracks (column 2), with a 10% increasing in our track feminization index (which is 
an average of the track’s subjects degree of feminization weighted by the coefficients of each 
subject in the exam) also leading to a 7% of a s.d. increase in the female oral/written 
premium. According to our linear specifications, the female oral/written premium would be 
around 20% in a hypothetical subject with no female scholars (first row, column 1), or in a 
hypothetical track where all subjects have no female scholars (first row, column 2).  
When indexes of feminization for both tracks and subjects are included in the regression 
model, only the subject index remains significant (column 3). This indicates that the 
variations in the gender premium at oral tests are probably more driven by variations between 
subjects than by variations between tracks. However, when absolute degree of feminization of 
subjects is replaced by the relative degree of feminization of subjects within tracks (   ), both 
this variable and the degree of feminization of tracks are significant determinants of the 
gender premium at oral tests (columns 5). This is an important result that summarizes well our 
analysis. It confirms that the premium for females at oral tests is affected by the degree of 
feminization of tracks, and that it is also affected on top of this first effect by the relative 
degree of feminization of each subject within the track. 
Our results could still be driven by differences in students' abilities if female candidates turn 
to be better at oral tests with respect to written tests in more male-connoted subjects and/or 
tracks. The design of the natural experiment we use does not allow us to control directly for 
this potential bias. However, a recent literature has now established that negative stereotypes 
against a given social group affect this group performance negatively when its identity is 
revealed. In a famous experiment among Indian subjects that were assigned the task to solve 
mazes under economic incentives, Hoff and Pandey (2006) have shown that revealing the 
subjects' caste before the task was lowering the performance of the lower castes (e.g. the 
untouchables). Such behaviors have been observed in different contexts (e.g. Stone et al., 
1999, concerning black students) and are likely to be explained by a decrease in self-
confidence among subjects facing a stereotype threat (Cadinu et al. 2005). Directly related to 
our context, Spencer et al. (1999) have shown that, as compared to a benchmark situation, 
female performance is higher at difficult math tests when these tests are advertised as not 
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producing gender differences (i.e. when the stereotype threat is lowered) and that it is lower 
when tests are advertised as producing gender differences (i.e. when the stereotype threat is 
increased). Overall, the literature strongly suggests that female performance at the ENS oral 
tests (where their type is revealed) as compared to written tests (where their type is not 
revealed) should be higher in the subjects and tracks in which the stereotype threat is the 
highest, i.e. the most male-connoted ones. In contrast, our results show the opposite. We thus 
conclude that if there are differences in oral abilities between subjects among the ENS 
candidates, these differences probably go against our results and lead us to underestimate the 
true discrimination made by the ENS jury. 
 
5. Discussion  
Our results show that professors discriminate in favor of the minority gender: girls are 
positively discriminated in majors and subjects identified as « masculine », while negatively 
discriminated in « feminine » tracks and subjects. This contributes to the literature by showing 
that the relative demand for students in science does not aggravate the existing gender gaps in 
the supply of students. However, our results do not show that the demand for females in 
science plays no role in the gender gap. Indeed, in our case, math professors discriminate in 
favor of girls, but they face a very segregated pool of candidates that contains only a few girls. 
Maybe would they discriminate against girls if they were more numerous among candidates. 
This study shows that the actual degree of segregation in the relative supply of females in 
science is larger than the “preferred gender gaps” on the demand side, not that the absolute 
demand is the same for female and male candidates. However, it seems clear that the reasons 
for the very large gender gaps across college majors may not be found exclusively on the 
demand side. Contrary to expectations if one draws straightforward interpretations from the 
literature on gender stereotypes, professors implement a strong positive discrimination in 
magnitude, even though not sufficient to compensate the huge gender gaps existing in the 
different majors. It raises many questions not only about the links between gender stereotypes 
and teacher grading behaviors, an issue that has been at the core of many scientific debates 
(Dee 2007; Lavy 2008), but also on the role played by professors in the gender gap (Carrell, 
Page & West 2010). We thus try to provide a couple of general explanations for our results. 
These explanations are likely to apply in a broad range of contexts and suggest that what we 
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observe is not driven by some specificities of the institution in which takes place our natural 
experiment. 
To begin with, the ENS and its jury members may implement a conscious affirmative action 
towards the minority gender in each major. In that case, our results would simply reflect that 
the ENS direction implements a policy towards gender equity and they would be arguably less 
interesting. However, the fact that we find very different estimates across subjects within a 
given track suggests that we observe more than an explicit policy in favor of the gender in 
minority in each track. Indeed, such a policy should probably lead to a similar premium for 
girls in all subjects of a given track. Another possibility is that the jury of the exam 
manipulates the candidates’ scores ex post in order to increase (or decrease) the final number 
of admitted girls
21
. The easiest (and discrete) way to do so is to favor girls (or boys) in the 
subjects that have the highest coefficients in each track, which turn to be those in which we 
observe the largest oral versus written differentials between females and males candidates 
(see Tables 4, A1 and A2). However, if such strategic manipulations really occur, they should 
concern only the candidates that are close to the admission threshold. Indeed, the jury does 
not want to admit a candidate that is too far from the required level or reject a candidate that 
had performed very well. Based on this observation, we have tried to detect the existence of 
strategic manipulations at the admission threshold. The number of candidates accepted each 
year in each track is defined by law in advance
22
. This implies that the ENS entrance exam is 
in fact a contest. As a consequence, there is not any predefined admission threshold in terms 
of average score: only the rank matters. The score threshold is defined each year depending 
on the level of the candidates. We have computed it as the mean of the total scores of the first 
rejected and last admitted candidates in each track each year. We have then normalized the 
candidates’ total scores in each track such that they have a unit standard deviation and such 
that the admission threshold correspond to a total score of 0 for all tracks and years. We first 
provide in figure 3 graphical evidence of possible discontinuities or changes in slope in the 
distribution of scores around the admission threshold. The admission threshold appears to be 
systematically located close to the mode of the total scores’ distribution. However, the 
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 The idea of such an ex post manipulation of grades may appear awkward in the sense that it is against basic 
principles of equity. However, we know from our interviews that the ENS jury does such manipulations some 
years, but rarely and especially in the Math-Physics track. The justification they give for this is that when a 
normally non-admitted candidate was especially good in one particular subject and really impressed the 
examiner, the jury tries to push this candidate above the admission threshold if she is not too far and if the 
subject is important for this track. Of course, since the ENS entrance exam is actually a contest (the number of 
places is fixed), this means that another candidate will happen to be non-admitted.  
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 This is because the ENS is a public institution financed by the French government which, as a consequence, 
strictly supervises its functioning.  
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distributions do not present any clear sign of discontinuity at the admission threshold. To 
confirm this graphical diagnosis, we performed McCrary test (McCrary, 2008), as it is 
standard in the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) literature. In our context, McCrary 
test relies on two hypotheses. First, the distribution of the candidates’ scores needs to be 
continuous in the absence of manipulation (this is a standard assumption in the RDD 
literature). Second, manipulation near the admission threshold needs to be “unilateral”, in the 
sense that the ENS jury may increase the total score of some candidates to push them above 
the threshold, but will never decrease the total score of candidates in order to pull them below 
the threshold
23
. Under both hypotheses, manipulation can be detected by the presence of a 
discontinuity in the scores’ distribution at the admission threshold. Even though the total 
scores’ distribution appears to reach a peak and to be a bit irregular around the threshold, 
McCrary test did not detect a lack of continuity at the admission threshold for any track 
except for Math-Physics (see figure 4). The latter track may be the only one where some 
strategic discrimination occurs to improve the gender mix. Notice, however, that the small 
discontinuity detected at the admission threshold in this track is negative, which is counter-
intuitive since we were expecting the jury to push some students above the threshold rather 
than the opposite. Despite this somehow puzzling exception, ex post strategic manipulation at 
the ENS entrance exam remains too limited to be detectable by standard analysis of the total 
scores’ distributions24.  
In order to directly confirm that such strategic discrimination is not driving our results, we 
also checked that the jury bias toward the minority gender is not concentrated only on 
candidates who were close to the admission threshold at the end of the eligibility step. If our 
results were driven by strategic discrimination to improve gender mix, the jury would have 
chosen students at the middle of the underlying ability distribution and we should not find 
significant biases on the other students. However, when we divide our sample in three groups 
according to the candidates’ ranks after the eligibility step, we also find the pattern exhibited 
in table 5 (i.e. that the gender gap in the written-oral differential varies with the tracks and 
                                                          
23
 Note that this second assumption was obviously verified in the original McCrary framework because 
manipulation at the threshold comes from the treated individuals themselves to move towards the preferred side 
of the threshold only. In our case, candidates can in principle be moved by the ENS jury in both directions. If the 
number of candidates moved by the ENS jury from under the threshold to above the threshold is equal to the 
number of candidates moved the other way around, the final scores’ distribution under manipulation will still be 
continuous and manipulation will as a consequence be undetectable. However, our interviews with the ENS jury 
suggest that this second hypothesis is likely to be true: the jury does not feel comfortable with explicitly 
penalizing a candidate ex post whereas they may be willing to favor one in some cases. 
24
 As a robustness check, we also performed McCrary tests for boys and girls separately, and we did not detect a 
lack of continuity at the admission threshold in any of these cases. Results available on request. 
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subjects degree of feminization) both for students located around and below the rank 
corresponding to the admission threshold (see table A6 reproducing columns 5 and 6 of table 
5 on subsamples of the data). We thus conclude that the general pattern of increasing bias for 
girls with the track and subject’s degree of masculinity cannot be explained by explicit 
affirmative action, that is, by a conscious policy of the ENS in favor of gender diversity.   
 
We distinguish between three mechanisms that are likely to generate positive discrimination 
towards the minority gender. First, our results could be explained by a taste-based 
discrimination where professors have a preference for gender diversity. This preference may 
be due to the lack of girls or boys in their field. They may enjoy more interviewing a boy if 
they only work daily with girls. This mechanism is much more plausible than the conscious 
affirmative action policy explanation, as it is consistent with the differences between subjects 
that we find in each track, for example the fact that the same girl is negatively discriminated 
by biology professors (a field where girls are not underrepresented) while positively 
discriminated by geology professors. Furthermore, during the ENS entrance exams, the stake 
is not only to put a grade on an academic performance. Admitted students will enter into one 
of the top French higher education institution whose role is precisely to train students for top 
research careers. As a consequence, when they evaluate students’ academic output, professors 
are simultaneously selecting people who are likely to become their peers within a few years. 
This situation differs strongly from examinations in contexts where candidates are not yet 
oriented towards a given career. In the case we study, a taste for gender diversity may have 
stronger effects on scores because professors directly affect the future gender mix in their 
field when they favor the gender in minority at the ENS entrance exams. 
Professors could also give a premium to candidates of the minority gender if they care not 
only about the actual performance, but also about the gap between the actual and the expected 
performance with regard to gender stereotypes. If they expect girls to have lower abilities in 
mathematics than boys, professors may give them a premium for the same performance 
because it reveals their motivation and their ability to provide worthwhile efforts. Motivation 
and perseverance may indeed be valued by professors as they signal students’ long-term 
potential. Such a mechanism seems likely at the ENS entrance exams where students are 
recruited for four years by researchers and are aimed to become researchers themselves, a 
profession that requires strong motivation and long-term investments (as the jury of the exam 
perfectly knows). Interestingly, this explanation is consistent with both dimensions of our 
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results. To begin with, students from the minority gender may signal stronger motivation and 
self-investment by choosing a major for which they have lower academic abilities. Professors 
may thereby give a premium to girls (resp. boys) in the more “masculine” (resp. “feminine”) 
tracks. Then, professors may not expect a given candidate in a given major to have the same 
abilities regarding its gender and the subject. Within each track, they may thus favor girls in 
the more “masculine” subject because the same performance level reveals higher abilities to 
get over difficulties. Our results are therefore also consistent with the idea that grades are 
partly based on the inferred student’s perseverance. This second plausible mechanism is 
different from discrimination strictly speaking, i.e. professors favoring a less worthy group. 
Precisely, professors may not judge this group less worthy as the actual performance may not 




A last plausible mechanism worth mentioning is a specific kind of statistical discrimination 
(Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973) that can occur if the candidates’ abilities are not perfectly 
observable during the ENS entrance exam tests. Arrow (1973) argues that discrimination can 
be rational even in the absence of both group-specific preferences and ex-ante differences in 
abilities between groups. As shown for the labor market with perfect information (Coate & 
Loury 1993; Moro & Norman 2004), this is because the beliefs of the employers concerning 
employees’ abilities are going to be self-fulfilling: since the employees who are believed to be 
less able will be less rewarded ex post, their incentive to invest in human capital is lower and 
they will indeed be less able at equilibrium. The theory applies well in our context: if teachers 
and professors have stereotypes against girls in math, girls do not have strong incentives to 
invest in math (i.e. to enter a math major) and they finally happen to be (in average) less good 
than boys at math at equilibrium even though there were no initial differences in abilities 
between the two groups. But what about the few girls that overcome the initial adversity in 
math and try to major in math anyway? Conditional on being observed in a math majors, girls 
might actually be better than boys because they have already managed to jump the hurdle that 
stereotypes have raised in front of them. This mechanism is similar to the “belief flipping” 
described by (Fryer 2007) in the labor market: “If an employer discriminates against a group 
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 Previous French sociological research states that jury only reward pure talent at ENS entrance exam (Bourdieu 
& Passeron 1989). We do not oppose here the idea that professors are primarily looking for the highest talents. 
Nevertheless, according to ENS entrance exam jury members that we have interviewed, only a few students 
really stand out from the others and can be easily graded as excellent whereas the jury confessed that it is 
actually difficult to score the other more average candidates’ performances at oral tests. The mechanism we 
describe concerns mainly these latter candidates, for whom other criteria such as the intrinsic motivation, 
perseverance and ability to provide future efforts may have an impact on scores. 
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of workers in her initial hiring, she may actually favor the successful members of that group 
[…]”. Fryer’s model can easily be applied to our setting: professors may have negative 
stereotypes against the general population of girls with regard to their abilities in math, but a 
positive prior towards the 9% of women who were successful enough to be eligible for oral 
tests at the ENS entrance exams in the Math-Physics major. If the candidates’ abilities are not 
perfectly observable during the ENS entrance exams, gender can be rationally used at oral 
tests as an additional piece of information concerning these abilities. In that case, our results 
could reflect pure statistical discrimination, but after a belief-flipping (à la Fryer) occurred, 
that is in a context where the minority gender is believed to be better because it has faced a 
stronger initial selection.  
As a conclusion, our results exhibit grade premiums toward the minority gender. This could 
be plausibly explained by three mechanisms: an unconscious taste-based discrimination with 
preference for diversity, a reward for high perseverance and motivation, or a statistical 
discrimination after a belief-flipping occurred. We are not able to disentangle these 
explanations using our data and this sounds a promising area for future research. However, 
our paper contributes to the literature on gender discrimination as it underlines the complexity 
of the relationships between stereotypes and discrimination, as well as the role of professors 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Kernel density estimates of scores at written and oral tests, by track 
 Notes: Kernel density estimates using Epanechnikov kernel function on Stata 12.0 software. The half-width of the kernel is 
an “optimal” width calculated automatically by the software, i.e. the width that would minimize the mean integrated 
squared error if the data were Gaussian and a Gaussian kernel was used.  
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Figure 2: The oral versus written premium for female in each track (graphical 
representation of the estimates of Table 4-Panel A). 
 
Note: Subjects are reported on the x-axis and tracks are reported on the y-axis.  Subjects and tracks have been ordered 
























Figure 3: Distribution of students’ total scores in each track 
 
Note: The distributions of the candidates’ total scores have been normalized in each track for each year (2004-
2009) such that (i) the admission threshold always corresponds to a score of 0 (vertical bar), (ii) they have a 
standard deviation equal to 1. 
 
Figure 4: McCrary test of a discontinuity at the admission threshold in each track 
 
Note: The distributions of the candidates’ total scores have been normalized in each track for each year (2004-
2009) such that (i) the admission threshold always corresponds to a score of 0 (vertical bar), (ii) they have a 
standard deviation equal to 1.The McCrary works as follows: (i) smooth the total scores’ distribution below and 
above the admission threshold, (ii) compute the confidence interval of the smoothed distributions, (ii) test if 
there is a significant discontinuity in the total scores’ distribution at the admission threshold. See McCrary 
(2007) for details. 
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Total eligible candidates 3068 747 506 438 335 1042 
Average per year 511 125 84 73 56 174 
Average admitted per 
year 
184 42 21 21 25 75 
% Girls among eligible 
candidates 
40% 9% 16% 56% 53% 64% 
% Admitted among 
eligible candidates 
36% 34% 25% 29% 45% 43% 
% Girls among admitted 
candidates 
40% 12% 13% 44% 47% 59% 
 
Table 2: Description of the subjects for which both a written and an oral test are 
available, by exam track 
   
















Math (0.152) 1480 956 Written 670 
 
Computer Sciences (0.192) Option  
    







   
668 2070 
Geography (0.319) 
   





Social Sciences (0.335) 











   
666 2073 
Latin/Ancient Greek 
(0.547)    
Option  1786 
Foreign languages (0.565) 1452 958 832 333 1878 
Note: Size samples are given for the subject that we keep in our empirical analysis. "Written" means that there is only a 
written test for the subject. "Option" means that the subject is optional at the written test, oral test or at both. A blank is 
left in the corresponding box when a subject does not belong to a given track exam. Data for Latin/Ancient Greek and 
Foreign languages are only kept for students who chose the same language at written and oral tests. 68% and 32% of 
Humanities students respectively chooses Latin and Ancient Greek. Foreign languages are English (69%), German (24%), 
Spanish (4%) and other languages (3%). Indexes of feminization are given in parenthesis for each subject and each track. 
Subjects and tracks are ordered according to these indexes.  
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Table 3: Gender bias in oral tests by track 












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Girl -0.051** 0.131* -0.045 -0.028 -0.047 -0.092** 
 
(0.024) (0.079) (0.070) (0.054) (0.061) (0.036) 
       














Observations 12,822 2,198 1,937 2,081 1,668 4,938 
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
       












N admitted girls (a) 438 29 17 56 71 265 
% among all admitted 
candidates 
39.60% 11.60% 13.49% 44.44% 47.02% 58.50% 
       
Counterfactual N  
admitted girls just 
after the eligibility 
step (b) 
458 18 15 62 77 286 
% among all 
counterfactual 
admitted students 
41.41% 7.50% 11.90% 49.21% 49.04% 61.11% 
Relative variation 
between (a) and (b) 
-4% 55% 13% -10% -4% -4% 
Note: Panel A - The dependent variable is the candidates' difference between the oral and written test scores in 
each subject in which written and an oral tests are both non-optional. The number of observations is thus for 
each track the number of candidates times the number of subjects. Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
Panel B – The counterfactual is the number of girls who would have been admitted if the exam was only made 
up by the eligibility step (anonymous written tests only). It is based on the eligibility rank computed by the 
exam board to determine the pool of eligible students, to which we applied the final admission threshold of 
each track. We estimated then the number of girls within the resulting counterfactual pool of admitted 
students.  







Table 4 : Gender differences between oral and written test scores 
- by subject and track (2004-2009) 











(0.216) (0.269) (0.342) (0.362) (0.435) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      









Physics (0.213) 0.113 0.131 0.099 
  
 












   
0.253* 0.081 









Social Sciences (0.335) 
   
0.012 
 




   
-0.141 -0.083 










   
-0.224 -0.004 
    
(0.149) (0.088) 
Latin/Ancient Greek (0.547)     -0.140* 
     (0.072) 




(0.117) (0.112) (0.089) 
 
(0.082) 
            
      
Observations 2,198 1,937 2,081 1,668 4,938 
R-squared 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.004 
Year*subject dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Controls No No No No No 
            
Note: The dependant variable is the candidate's difference between the oral and written test scores. Interactions between 
the girl dummy and each subject dummies are estimated and reported on the table. Indexes of feminization are given in 
parenthesis for each subject and each track. Subjects and tracks are ordered according to these indexes. Robust Standard 




Table 4 : Gender differences between oral and written test scores 
- by subject and track (2004-2009) 











(0.216) (0.269) (0.342) (0.362) (0.435) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      








 Physics (0.213) 0.199 0.113 0.171 
  
 
(0.200) (0.190) (0.156) 







  Philosophy (0.257) 
   
0.468** 0.430*** 
 









  Social Sciences (0.335) 




   
(0.197) 
 History (0.389) 
   
0.082 0.269** 
 









  Literature (0.535) 
   
REFERENCE 0.347*** 
 
    
(0.118) 
Latin/Ancient Greek (0.547) 
    
0.197* 
 
    
(0.113) 
Foreign languages (0.565) REFERENCE REFERENCE REFERENCE  REFERENCE 
      
            
      
Observations 2,198 1,937 2,081 1,668 4,938 
R-squared 0.361 0.273 0.251 0.225 0.213 
Year*subject dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Note: The dependent variable is the candidate's difference between the oral and written test scores. Interactions between 
the girl dummy and each subject dummies are estimated with individual fixed effects (literature is the reference subject for 
the Social Sciences track ; foreign language for all other tracks) and reported on the table. Indexes of feminization are given 
in parenthesis for each subject and each track. Subjects and tracks are ordered according to these indexes.  Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 




Table 5 : Estimated Gender Bias with indexes for Subjects and Tracks Degree 
of Feminization 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
            
Girl 0.225*** 0.208* 0.274** -0.039 0.274**  
 (0.066) (0.123) (0.125) (0.024) (0.125)  





















 Girl*    
   
-0.631*** -0.678*** 
 
    
(0.163) (0.165) 
 
       Observations 12,822 12,822 12,822 12,822 12,822 12,822 
R-squared 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.247 
Track all all all all all all 
Individual 
fixed effects 
No No No No No Yes 
year*subject 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The dependent variable is the candidate's difference between the oral and written test scores. "Is" is the subject 
feminization index, "It" the track feminization index and "Ist" their difference. Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 







Table A1 : Description of the settings of ENS entrance exam in scientific tracks 
Track   Math-Physics   Physics-Chemistry   Biology-Geology 










    
    
Written 
tests for all 
candidates 
Math 1 (6) Math 1 (6) 
 




















Math (5) Math (5) 
 
Physics (2) Physics (3) 
      
Geology (2) Geology (5) 









        
French (8) French (8) 
 
French (8) French (8) 
 
French (8) French (8) 
FL 1 (3) FL 1 (3) 
 
FL 1 (3) FL 1 (3) 
 
FL 1 (3) FL 1 (3) 
FL 2 (3) FL 2 (3) 
 
FL 2 (3) FL 2 (3) 
 
FL 2 (3) FL 2 (3) 
      













































































lab work  
(8) 
   
SPW  (8) SPW (8) 
 
SPW (8) SPW (8) 
 
SPW (15) SPW (15) 
FL (3) FL (3) 
 
FL (3) FL (3) 
 
FL (3) FL (3) 
Note: Tests' weights in parenthesis.. Tests  kept in the final sample are underlined. 




Table A2 : Description of the settings of ENS entrance exam in 
Social sciences and Humanities 
Track   Social Sciences Humanities 








History (3) History (3) 
 
Philosophy (3) Philosophy (3) 
 
Literature (3) Literature (3) 
 
Social Sciences (3) Foreign language (3) 
 
Maths (3) Latin/Ancient Greek (3) 
 
Specialty subject1 (3) Specialty subject2 (3) 
        
 
 




Oral tests for eligible 
candidates only 
 
History (2)3 History (2)3 
 
Philosophy (2)3 Philosophy (2)3 
 




Foreign language (2)3 
 
Social Sciences (2)3 Latin/Ancient Greek (2)3 
 
Maths (2)3 Specialty subject2 (3) 
 
Specialty subject1 (3) 
 
        
Note: Tests' weights in parenthesis.                                                                                              
1 : The Specialty subjects chosen by candidates from the Social Sciences track should be drawn 
from the following list : Latin, Ancient Greek, Foreign Language, Geography. For the oral test, 
Social Sciences may also be chosen by eligible candidates. Eligible candidates may choose a 
different Specialty subject for the written and oral tests.    
2 :  The Specialty subjects chosen by candidates from the Humanities track : Latin, Ancient Greek, 
Literature, Philosophy, Music studies, Art studies, Theater studies, Film studies, Foreign 
Language, Geography. Eligible candidates may choose a different Specialty subject for the 
written and oral tests.    
3 : Eligible candidates from the Social Sciences track (resp. Humanities track) choose one of these 
















  Boys Girls Diff   Boys Girls Diff   Boys Girls Diff   Boys Girls Diff   Boys Girls Diff 










29% 22% ** 
High Honors Baccalaureat 
graduate 








69% 77% ** 












Repeater at preparatory cursus 38% 34% 
  








                                        










Note - The "Low social background" dummy equals 1 if the candidate's father belongs to the middle or lower class regarding its occupation. The "Highest Honours 
Baccalaureat graduate" dummy equals 1 if the candidate graduated the French Baccalaureat exam at the end of high school with a grade superior or equals to 16 
over 20. The "High quality preparatory school" equals 1 if the candidate comes from a preparatory school where at least 4 students managed to be admitted to the 
ENS during the 2006-2009 period, i.e 1 student per year in the average. The "Repeater at preparatory cursus" equals 1 if the candidate has repeated its second 
preparatory year to resit the "Grandes Ecoles" entrance exams. For each variable and track, the gender gap is tested by Pearson's chi-square test and the significance 




Table A4 : Gender differences between oral and written test scores 
- by subject and track (2004-2009) 











(0.216) (0.269) (0.342) (0.362) (0.435) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      








 Physics (0.213) -0.150 0.158 0.131 
  
 
(0.217) (0.168) (0.147) 








  Philosophy (0.257) 
   
0.212 0.132 
 









  Social Sciences (0.335) 




   
(0.180) 
 History (0.389) 
   
-0.157 -0.033 
 









  Literature (0.535) 
   
-0.272 0.078 
 
   
(0.182) (0.110) 
Latin/Ancient Greek (0.547)     -0.091 
     (0.092) 




(0.124) (0.140) (0.109) 
 
(0.105) 
            
 
     Observations 1,402 1,266 1,423 1,108 3,237 
R-squared 0.018 0.026 0.021 0.020 0.015 
Year*subject dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Note: The dependant variable is the candidate's difference between the oral and written test scores. Interactions between 
the girl dummy and each subject dummies are estimated and reported on the table. Individual characteristics controls are 6 
father's and 6 mother's occupation dummies, a dummy for repeater students at preparatory cursus, 4 dummies for 
"Baccalaureat" distinction levels, and a dummy for "High quality" preparatory school. Robust Standard errors in 
parentheses. Indexes of feminization are given in parenthesis for each subject and each track. Subjects and tracks are 
ordered according to these indexes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A4 : Gender differences between oral and written test scores 
- by subject and track (2004-2009) 











(0.216) (0.269) (0.342) (0.362) (0.435) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      








 Physics (0.213) 0.108 -0.091 0.025 
  
 
(0.149) (0.131) (0.110) 







  Philosophy (0.257) 
   
0.158 -0.051 
 









  Social Sciences (0.335) 




   
(0.126) 
 History (0.389) 
   
-0.071 -0.178** 
 









  Literature (0.535) 
   
-0.167 0.001 
 
   
(0.126) (0.077) 




(0.103) (0.111) (0.085) 
 
(0.072) 
Foreign languages (0.565) 
    
-0.110 
 
    
(0.067) 
            
 
     Observations 2,198 1,937 2,081 1,668 4,938 
R-squared 0.234 0.287 0.332 0.349 0.322 
Year*subject dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls for initial ability Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
            
Note: The dependent variable is the candidate's difference between the oral and written test scores. Interactions between 
the girl dummy and each subject dummies are estimated and reported on the table. The initial ability control is the written 
score's quartile. Indexes of feminization are given in parenthesis for each subject and each track. Subjects and tracks are 





Table A4 : Gender differences between oral and written test scores 
- by subject and track (2004-2009) 











(0.216) (0.269) (0.342) (0.362) (0.435) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      








 Physics (0.213) 0.043 -0.265 -0.035 
  
 
(0.169) (0.176) (0.139) 







  Philosophy (0.257) 
   
0.311* 0.167* 
 









  Social Sciences (0.335) 




   
(0.166) 
 History (0.389) 
   
0.095 0.054 
 









  Literature (0.535) 
    
0.231** 
 
    
(0.101) 
Latin/Ancient Greek (0.547) 
    
0.121 
 
    
(0.100) 




                 
 
     Observations 2,198 1,937 2,081 1,668 4,938 
R-squared 0.553 0.510 0.560 0.541 0.509 
Fixed effects Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual 
Controls Initial ability Initial ability Initial ability Initial ability Initial ability 
            
Note: The dependent variable is the candidate's difference between the oral and written test scores. Interactions between 
the girl dummy and each subject dummies are estimated with individual fixed effects (foreign language is the reference 
subject) and reported on the table. The initial ability control is the written score's quartile. Indexes of feminization are given 
in parenthesis for each subject and each track. Subjects and tracks are ordered according to these indexes. Robust 





Table A5: Estimated Gender Bias with indexes for Subjects Degree of 
Feminization by track 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
          












 Girl*Is -0.707*** -0.603*** -0.925** -0.915** -0.105 -0.099 
 
(0.158) (0.158) (0.388) (0.414) (0.408) (0.432) 
             
       Observations 12,822 12,822 2,198 2,198 1,937 1,937 
R-squared 0.002 0.247 0.003 0.360 0.000 0.271 









Fixed effects year*subject indiv year*subject indiv year*subject indiv 
              
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 













 Girl*Is -0.952** -0.932** -0.574 -0.548 -0.828*** -0.855*** 
 
(0.376) (0.374) (0.447) (0.456) (0.303) (0.300) 
             
       Observations 2,081 2,081 1,668 1,668 4,938 4,938 











Fixed effects year*subject indiv year*subject indiv year*subject indiv 
              
Note: The dependent variable is the candidate's difference between the oral and written test scores. "Is" is the subject 









Table A6 :Distribution of the Estimated Gender Bias with indexes for Subjects 
and Tracks Degree of Feminization 
Sample :Position 
wrt threshold 
Below Around Above Below Around Above 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
            
Girl 0.383** -0.123 0.206 
   
 
(0.184) (0.230) (0.248) 
   
       
Girl*   
 
   
-0.759*** -0.746** 0.005 
    
(0.274) (0.376) (0.320) 
 
Girl*   
 
-1.238** 0.218 -0.761 
   
 
(0.497) (0.611) (0.657) 
    
Girl*    
 
-1.043*** -0.822*** -0.039 
   
 
(0.275) (0.302) (0.288) 
   
                
Observations 5,246 3,812 3,764 5,246 3,812 3,764 
R-squared 0.024 0.027 0.044 0.290 0.341 0.312 
Track all all all all all all 
Individual fixed 
effects 
No No No Yes Yes Yes 
year*subject 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The dependent variable is the candidate's difference between the oral and written test scores. Columns (2) 
and (5) give the results estimated on the 30% candidates who were "around" the admission threshold at the end of 
the eligibility step (15% above, 15% below). Estimates for candidates below and above the latters are presented 
respectively on columns (1)-(4) and columns (3)-(6). "Ij" is the subject feminization index, "It" the track feminization 
index and "Ijt" their difference. Robust Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
